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ABSTRACT
Many Internet of Things (IoT) devices have voice user interfaces
(VUIs). One of the most popular VUIs is Amazon’s Alexa, which
supports more than 47,000 third-party applications (“skills”). We
study how Alexa’s integration of these skills may confuse users.
Our survey of 237 participants found that users do not understand
that skills are often operated by third parties, that they often con-
fuse third-party skills with native Alexa functions, and that they are
unaware of the functions that the native Alexa system supports. Sur-
prisingly, users who interact with Alexa more frequently are more
likely to conclude that a third-party skill is native Alexa functional-
ity. The potential for misunderstanding creates new security and
privacy risks: attackers can develop third-party skills that operate
without users’ knowledge or masquerade as native Alexa functions.
To mitigate this threat, we make design recommendations to help
users distinguish native and third-party skills.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Human and societal aspects of security
and privacy; •Human-centered computing→ Empirical studies
in HCI ; Ubiquitous and mobile computing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Voice User Interfaces (VUIs) are a common way to interact with an
increasing number of smart-home Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
On Amazon Echo (and related devices, such as the Echo Dot), the
most popular type of voice assistant [1], a VUI known as the Alexa
voice service (“Alexa”) enables users to use only voice to interact
with the device’s wide range of functions. These so-called skills
(analogous to applications or “apps” on mobile devices) range from
setting an alarm clock, telling jokes, to sending money. Although
some of the skills ship with Alexa by default, native to the Alexa
platform, there are more than 47,000 skills that are developed by
third parties, which users can invoke to add new functions to their
Echo devices [2]. Amazon has made certain decisions concerning
the integration of these skills that sometimes make it difficult to
determine the agent responsible for implementing the skill (i.e.,
whether it is Amazon or some other third party).
In this paper, we seek to understand the extent to which these
design decisions make it difficult for users to determine whether
they are interacting with native Amazon functionality or with
arbitrary third parties. To do so, we conducted a survey between
March and May 2019 with 237 new and existing users of Alexa,
including 103 undergraduates, and 134 Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers. Most participants were unaware that Alexa skills can be
(and often are) developed by third-party developers. Our work is
distinct from previous work on VUIs in this regard, which has
focused more generally on how users interact with VUIs [3–8], but
not specifically on their interactions with third-party skills, or their
ability to distinguish third-party skills from native ones.
In each survey, we present each participant with video and audio
clips of interactions with three types of skills in the lab—(1) Alexa’s
native skills, (2) publicly available third-party skills, and (3) mali-
cious skills that we developed and which are not publicly available—
without revealing to the participant which exactly which type of
skill is being presented. The participants’ reactions to these clips
suggest that, even after learning that some Alexa skills are devel-
oped by third parties, the participants were often unable to dif-
ferentiate between native and third-party skills or between native
skills and malicious third-party skills, and that the participants did
not understand what functionalities are possible through native or
third-party skills.
We discovered that Alexa users are unable to differentiate native
skills from third-party skills. Much to our surprise, we found that
users who have more familiarity and experience with Alexa are in
fact more likely to mistakenly assume that a third-party skill is in
fact native Amazon functionality. We also found that some partici-
pants were unaware that skills could be developed by third parties,
that most participants failed to distinguish native and third-party
skills and voice messages, and that they often did not understand
what functions or voice commands were available on Alexa. As
a result, a user may confuse a skill, whether malicious or benign,
with a native skill or another benign skill, thus potentially exposing
sensitive information to an unintended third party.
Our findings suggest that participants’ misunderstandings of
Alexa skills are rooted in two design decisions that run counter to
Norman’s design principles [9]. First, Alexa’s responses from na-
tive functions sound the same as third-party skills. Presumably this
design decision was made to create a seamless user experience, but
it can also cause confusion concerning whether the skill is native
to the Echo or whether the skill constitutes a third-party applica-
tion. In contrast to graphical user interfaces (GUIs) on computers
and mobile devices, which typically offer visual cues that aim to
help users distinguish between applications, VUIs can have more
difficulty providing direct cues to users. For example, the Echo has
a colored light that indicates the state of the device, but it does not
offer any information concerning the skill the user is interacting
with [10]. As such, a user may not be aware of whether he or she
is interacting with a native skill or third-party skill, or specifically
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which third-party skill has been invoked. This confusion could ulti-
mately lead to security and privacy risks. For example, past research
has shown that a malicious third-party developer could develop a
new skill that mimics the behavior of an existing benign skill in an
attempt to trick users into revealing sensitive information [11, 12].
Second, Alexa has effectively infinite voice commands, which
makes it difficult for users to understand what and how different
skills being invoked and what voice command might potentially
invoke a skill. In particular, a user could invoke the same skill with
different commands; for example, “set an alarm at 8 am” and “wake
me up at 8 am” achieve the same functionality on Alexa. Each of
the 47,000 third-party skills may define arbitrary voice commands.
For example, there are at least 200 joke-related skills [13], each with
its own voice commands, ranging from “Open knock knock” [14]
to “Ask daily jokes to give me a joke [15].” Because a typical user is
unlikely to known or remember all available commands, users can
find it difficult to knowwhat functionality is and is not supported by
Alexa. The inability to distinguish native and third-party skills has
potential security and privacy implications: A malicious third-party
developer could take advantage of this design, create a skill that
responds to user commands that might otherwise be unrecognizable
by Alexa, and trick the user into using the malicious skill.
These findings suggest clear directions for design improvements,
including better ways to users to distinguish native from third-party
contexts, as well as consistent design standards and interaction
modes for third-party skills that run on the Alexa platform.
2 BACKGROUND: ALEXA SKILLS
Recent years have seen a proliferation of voice-enabled IoT de-
vices, ranging from phones, voice assistants, microwaves, to car
navigation systems. This paper focuses on one specific type of
voice-enabled device can host third-party applications. In this sec-
tor, Amazon is the dominant player with 61% market share across
its Alexa-enabled Echo devices (Google has the second highest with
17%) [1]. To further spread Alexa, Amazon has built the Alexa Voice
Service which can configure other smart devices (not made by Ama-
zon) to run Alexa software [16]. Thus, Alexa can be seen as the
clear leader in the field and a useful case study for understanding
how users interact with VUIs for virtual assistants. We provide an
overview of Alexa’s skill ecosystem and a description on how users
invoke and interact with skills.
2.1 Native and Third-Party
Alexa supports two types of skills: (1) native skills and (2) third-
party skills. Native skills come built-in by Amazon and thus only
involve code and dialog developed by Amazon. For example, users
can ask for the time, set an alarm, or play music from Amazon
Music. As Amazon is the sole developer for these skills, we assume
that all information collected from users flows only to Amazon.
To support a broader range of functions, Amazon allows third-
party developers to build skills for Alexa using the Alexa Skills Kit.
Using the skills kit, developers can configure Alexa to communicate
with their own services, create custom Alexa responses, and run
custom code on their own servers [17]. Third-party developers have
built at least 47,000 skills, including a wide variety of functions such
as playing podcasts, locking doors, checking credit card balances,
and telling jokes, that are publicly available on the Amazon Skill
Store [2]. Since the code of these skills could be on third-party
servers, we assume that some of the information collected from
users may flow to the third-party developers (in addition to Ama-
zon).
2.2 Invoking Skills
Whether a skill is native or third-party, a user can invoke (i.e.,
verbally enable) it by saying the corresponding invocation phrases.
These phrases follow the form of “Open <invocation name> for
<optional action>” where the invocation name is often the name
of the skill. Examples include “Alexa, open Jeopardy” (i.e., a game
shown in the US) and “Alexa, ask Daily Horoscopes about Taurus.”
However, Alexa allows some flexibility in invoking skills. For
some native skills such as the alarm clock, a user can invoke it
via either “Alexa, set an alarm for 8 am” or “Alexa, wake me up at
8 am.” For third-party skills, users replace “Open” with one of 13
words such as “play”, “open”, and “launch”. If none of these phrases
are present, Alexa automatically parses the user’s statement for an
invocation name and responds with the corresponding skill [18].
However, invocation names do not appear to be unique, as we have
found skills with the same invocation names. It is unclear how
Alexa chooses which skill to invoke given two skills with the same
invocation name.
2.3 Interacting with Skills
Once a user invokes a skill, Alexa enters what we call the skill’s
context. At the time of writing, Alexa does not visually (through
the device lights) or verbally confirm which context a user is in;
in fact, Alexa’s voice sounds exactly the same. Once Alexa is in a
skill’s context, Alexa accepts only voice commands predefined by
that skill, along with phrases such as “cancel” or “quit” that allow
users to leave the skill’s context and invoke a different skill. A user
cannot invoke a second skill until the user leaves the first skill’s
context.
3 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we provide a literature review of VUIs, focusing
on how to design VUIs, how humans interact with VUIs, and secu-
rity/privacy concerns regarding VUIs.
3.1 Designing Voice User Interfaces
Design patterns for graphical user interfaces are a well-established
field [19], but paradigms for VUI design are scarce to our knowl-
edge, presumably because voice assistants and other voice-enabled
technologies have only taken off in recent years. One example
of literature in VUI designs is Cathy Pearl’s Designing Voice User
Interfaces: Principles of Conversational Experiences [20], which cov-
ers design principles such as always confirming users’ voice input
or handling ambiguous voice commands. However, the authors
assumes that only the first party (i.e., the device manufacturer)
engages in conversation with users without considering third-party
capabilities such as skills. Similarly, López et al. [21] evaluated the
usability of popular VUIs such as Alexa and Apple Siri in terms
of correctness of responses and how natural the responses sound;
again, this work did not consider third-party functionalities. In fact,
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we are unaware of any literature in VUI design that incorporates
skills, and we are among the first to discuss skill-enabled VUI design
in the research community.
Despite the apparent lack of literature, there are general design
principles that could apply to our case. Don Norman’s Design of
Everyday Things [9] introduces seven fundamental principles of
design, three of which are especially relevant to this study of VUIs:
(1) Discoverability, which, when applied to skills, suggests that
Alexa should let users know what voice commands are available;
(2) Feedback, which suggests that Alexa should inform users of
which skills they are currently interacting with; and (3) Conceptual
Model, which would require Alexa to help users understand that
skills are developed by third parties. As we will show in the survey
results, Alexa’s design appear inconsistent with these principles,
thus exposing users to security and privacy risks. We leave for
future work to evaluate Alexa’s design against the remaining four
design principles: affordances, signifiers, mappings, and constraints.
3.2 Human Interactions with Voice User
Interfaces
A large body of work studies how humans interact with VUIs and
what kind of relationship is developed as a result. For instance,
researchers found that some users personified their VUI devices
and treated the devices with emotion as if the devices were family
members or friends [3–5]. Past work has also found that interac-
tions with VUIs were integrated with activities or conversations
involving the entire household, including children [6, 7]. However,
some researchers identified privacy concerns for VUIs in the public
space, resulting in greater user caution when users transmitted
sensitive information than non-sensitive information [8]. In this
paper, we also study how users interact with a VUI (i.e., Alexa), but
we specifically focus on how users could be confused by Alexa’s
design and how users might leak sensitive information due to this
confusion.
3.3 Security and Privacy Risks
Users face multiple security and privacy risks that originate from a
number of actors. First, manufacturers of voice assistants, i.e., the
first parties, may collect potentially sensitive recordings of users
without the users’ knowledge, for instance, through the always-
on microphones. This design may lead to accidentally recording
sensitive conversations and sharing the data with the manufac-
turers [22, 23]. In addition to manufacturers, third-party skills (or
“actions” on Google Home) could also present security and privacy
risks to users. In particular, a third-party malicious skill could ef-
fectively phish a user by pretending to be another benign skill. As
demonstrated in a proof of concept by Kumar et al. [24] and Zhang
et al. [25], a malicious skill could use an invocation name that
sounds similar to a benign skill, such as “Capital One” (legitimate
banking skill) and “Capital Won” (malicious skill).
At the time of writing, neither Amazon Alexa nor Google Home
provides users with audio or visual clues regarding which skill the
user is interacting with. This design decision may result in users
invoking the wrong skills and providing sensitive information to
malicious third parties. While both of these papers focused on skills
with similar-sounding names, we study how users could be con-
fused by skills in general (including those with similar-sounding
names). Also, whereas these papers demonstrated attackers’ capa-
bilities, we empirically show, from the user’s perspective, that a
user could fall prey to such malicious skills.
4 SURVEY METHOD
To understand how users conceptualize and interact with Alexa
and its skills, we conducted surveys of both Alexa owners and
non-owners in two populations: 103 undergraduate and gradu-
ate university students (“University Survey”) and 134 participants
through Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk Survey”). Having both
surveys enabled us to survey a wide swath of participants [26]. We
tested both owners and non-owners to better understand whether
previously owning or using an Alexa affected a participant’s famil-
iarity with the device and how skills operate. Both surveys were
approved by our university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
4.1 Recruitment
Recruitment method: We conducted the University Survey be-
tween March 27 and April 10, 2019. We recruited 103 U.S. univer-
sity student participants by email through our university’s survey
research center (SRC). The SRC randomly selected students and
emailed them a link to the survey hosted on Qualtrics. We incen-
tivized participation by awarding approximately 1/10 participants
with an Amazon Echo device. We did not require Alexa ownership
or experience in the recruitment criteria, although participants who
decided to take the survey were presumably aware of or interested
in Alexa.
Based on our initial findings, we expanded the survey (i.e., ask-
ing participants how often they used Alexa) and conducted the
MTurk Survey between April 19 and May 9, 2019. Through Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), we recruited 134 English-speaking
participants with at least a bachelor’s degree. Participants were
paid at least minimum wage for the ten-minute survey. To ensure
quality responses, we shared the survey only with MTurk users
with approval ratings over 95% and who were MTurk “masters”,
a special designation Amazon gives only to the top-performing
MTurk users. Again, Alexa ownership or experience was not a part
of the recruitment criteria.
Removing participants: To exclude low-quality responses and
their participants, we added multiple attention checks throughout
Survey Sections 3 and 4 (i.e., after we described key concepts such
as skills in Survey Section 2), such as “who build native Alexa
skills” and “who build third-party Alexa skills,” with “Amazon” and
“non-Amazon” as the choices. In doing so, we hoped to remove
participants who failed to understand the concept of third-party
skills. In a further effort to filter out low-quality participants, we
also prevented re-try attempts and added a time-limit to the survey.
Characteristics of participants: Of the participants reached
through our university’s SRC, all were current undergraduate or
graduate students. While participants came from a wide range of
specific majors, about 40.4% were in an engineering-related sub-
ject. 51.0% identified as male, 47.0% as female, and 2.0% as other.
19.6% of participants own an Alexa. We did not ask how often the
participants used their Alexa devices.
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For the MTurk survey, all participants have a bachelor’s degree
(as verified by Mechanical Turk), a 95% approval rating or higher,
and Mechanical Turk “Masters” status. 51.9% identified as male and
48.1% as female. 75.2% of participants own an Alexa. Of those that
own an Alexa, 34.0% have owned it for less than a year, 40.0% for 1-2
years, and 26.0% for over 2 years. A majority (56.1%) use it several
times a day while 9.2% use it less than once a week, 7.1% once a
day, and 27.6% several times a week.
Limitations: Because our study is limited to current university
students and users of Amazon Mechanical Turk, our overall subject
population is likely more tech-savvy than the general population.
For example, 86% of MTurk participants owned either an Alexa or
some other smart device (smart device being defined as any Internet-
connected device other than a computer or phone). Nevertheless,
we believe that our results are generally applicable; if anything,
the general population that is less tech-savvy would highlight a
general lack of awareness about Alexa skills than our survey results
already do with the tech-savvy population.
4.2 Survey Questions
The general goals of the survey were to understand what are partic-
ipants’ privacy expectations with regard to native and third-party
skills on Alexa, whether participants can differentiate between na-
tive and third-party functionality, and whether participants know
what voice commands skills accept. To this end, we included the
following four sections in the Qualtrics survey.
4.2.1 Survey Section 1: Pre-definitionQuestions about Alexa. Through
this survey section, we aimed to understand users’ privacy expecta-
tions of skills before we defined the terms native/third-party skills
for them. Per Norman’s design principles [9], our goal was to check
whether users’ Conceptual Model of third-party skills was consis-
tent with the reality.
To this end, we asked the following questions. We first asked a
general true/false question, “Everything Alexa says is programmed
by Amazon,” and we counted the number of respondents with each
answer “yes” or “no” (correct answer).
Additionally, we produced and presented the following videos
in order, in which a member of the research team engaged in a
conversation with Alexa in the lab. We then asked users where
they thought the data from the conversation was sent: to “Only
Amazon”, “Only Third Parties”, or “Both”. Interested readers can
view all our videos (including those in later survey sections) at
our anonymized project webpage, https://sites.google.com/view/
alexawhoamispeakingto/.
• Video 1A: Add Rubber Ball to Shopping Cart
A user (i.e., a member of the research team) asks Alexa to add
a rubber ball to his cart, and Alexa responds, “Ok, I’ve added
a choice for rubber ball to David’s Amazon Cart.” This is an
actual interaction that occurs when a user asks Alexa to add
an item to the cart. In the survey, we asked each participant,
“Immediately as result of the following conversation, what
parties do you think know David added a rubber ball to his
Amazon cart?” The correct response is “Only Amazon.”
• Video 1B: Bedtime Story
The following conversation occurs:
User : “Alexa, open ‘I’m going to bed’.”
Alexa: “Time for a bedtime story! First, what’s your name?”
User : “Benji.”
Alexa: “Ok, Benji! Here’s your story.”
This skill is an example third-party bedtime story skill we
built (which we did not publicly release). In the survey, we
asked each participant, “Immediately as result of the follow-
ing conversation, what parties do you think know your name
is ‘Benji’?” The correct response is “Both.”
After showing Video 1B, we asked each participant to provide a
free-text open-ended response to explain their rationale for their
answer.
4.2.2 Survey Section 2: Defining Key Alexa Concepts/Terms. In this
survey section, we briefly described to participants what an Alexa
skill is and what native and third-party skills mean. The goal is for
us to ensure, to our best effort, that the participants understood
these concepts in later sections, as we would test whether partici-
pants could distinguish between native and third-party skills and
capabilities.
4.2.3 Survey Section 3: Differentiating Native and Third-Party Skills.
To test whether participants could differentiate between native
third-party skills – effectively whether Alexa was able to offer
Feedback (per Norman’s design principles [9]) on which skills a
user was interacting with – we embedded five video clips and five
audio clips in this section of the Qualtrics survey and asked for the
participants’ response. Similar to Videos 1A and 1B, we produced
the following clips ourselves and presented them to the participants
in order.
The video clips show a member of the research team interacting
with a native or third-party skill. After we showed each clip, we
asked participants whether the participant had interacted with a
native or third-party Alexa skill.
• Video 3A: Tell a Joke (native). A user asks Alexa for a
joke and Alexa responds with a joke.
• Video 3B: Jeopardy (third-party). A user asks Alexa to
play Jeopardy (a US game show) and the game begins with
the voice of Alex Trebek (Jeopardy’s host).
• Video 3C: Baseball Scores (third-party).Auser asks Alexa
about the Astros (a baseball team) and Alexa responds with
the latest scores.
• Video 3D: Rain Sounds (third-party). A user asks Alexa
to play rain sounds and Alexa responds with the sound.
• Video 3E: Parental Controls (third-party). A user asks
Alexa to enable parental controls and Alexa responds con-
firming the user would like to do that. While Videos 3B
through 3D feature real skills available on the Amazon Skill
Store, the parental control skill in this video is not public;
in fact, we developed this skill ourselves using Alexa Skill
Kit and made it available only to the Amazon Echo in our
lab. We designed this skill to sound as if it could config-
ure parental controls on Alexa, although in reality parental
controls cannot be configured verbally with Alexa.
We also showed audio messages that we recorded from a native
skill or third-party skill. The third-party skill could be from the Skill
Store [2], or it could be developed by us and not released publicly.
We asked each participant to respond whether the message was a
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real system message (i.e., native skill) or a fake one (i.e., third-party
skill masquerading as a native skill).
• Audio 3A:Wi-Fi (fake). “You seem to be disconnected from
Wi-Fi. Please hold down the circle button in order to recon-
nect.” Similar to the skill in Video 3E, we developed a private
skill that hard-coded the message above. Following the in-
structions would initiate a hard reset of the device.
• Audio 3B: Problem with Response (real). “There was a
problemwith the requested skill’s response.” Alexa generates
this verbal message when a third-party skill’s response is
not configured correctly.
• Audio 3C: Link (fake). “Sorry, something is wrong with
this device. Please restart or go to amazon.com/alexa for
more information.” Again, we developed this private skill
ourselves. A malicious third-party skill could say this mes-
sage (e.g., in the middle of other activities of the skill, thus
giving the illusion that this is a system-generated message) ,
replacing the URL with that of a phishing website to obtain
sensitive user information.
• Audio 3D: Sorry (real). “Sorry, I’m not sure about that.”
Alexa generates this message when it cannot understand the
user’s voice commands.
• Audio 3E: Amazon Account (fake). “Sorry, before using
this device you need to connect your Amazon account.” We
developed this private skill ourselves.
4.2.4 Survey Section 4: Voice Commands that Alexa Understands.
Finally, we aimed to test whether Alexa offers users Discoverability,
per Norman’s design principles [9], or whether users know what
voice commands can be understood by Alexa.
In particular, we asked participants whether the following invo-
cation phrases could open skills on Alexa: “Open Grubhub,” “What’s
the NY Times report,” “Find my iPhone,” “Quit,” “Please go away,”
and “There’s a bug over there.” With the exception of “Quit” (which
lets users leave a particular skill), all these phrases can open actual
Alexa skills on the Skill Store or those we developed in private (e.g.,
“Please go away” and “There’s a bug over there.”).
We also asked whether certain actions can be accomplished with
Alexa verbally: changing device volume, muting device, checking
WiFi connection, changing Amazon password, ordering items on
Amazon, turning off device, and turning on/off parental controls.
At the time of writing, the only actions that Alexa can accomplish
are changing device volume and ordering Amazon items. These
questions are relevant, as participants’ expectations of what can be
done onAlexa andwhat invokes third parties onAlexa can influence
their ability to differentiate between native and third-party skills.
4.3 Data Analysis
Preparing data for analysis:Wedownloaded the survey responses
from Qualtrics as CSV files and analyzed the data in Python Pandas.
We removed 3 University participants and 48 MTurk participants
for failing the attention checks.
Labeling participant groups: As will be discussed in the Find-
ings section, we analyzed the responses in terms of different levels
of familiarity and experience with Alexa. To facilitate this analysis,
we created three participant groups: (i) “Everyone, ” which refers
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Figure 1: Number of participants. The numbers in parenthe-
ses indicate the sample size.
to all 237 participants; “Owners/All,” which is a subset of “Every-
one” that refers to those that own Alexa devices, including 21 and
101 participants in the University and MTurk surveys respectively;
and “Owners/Freq,” which is a subset of “Owners/All” that includes
owners of Alexa that had owned the device for at least a year and
indicated usage “multiple times a day or more.” We used these labels
to denote users with potentially increasing levels of familiarity and
experience with Alexa. Since we did not ask how often University
participants used Alexa, all 41 “Owners/Freq” participants were
from the MTurk survey. We provide a summary in Figure 1.
Coding free-text responses: For each free-text open-ended
survey question, one member of the research team coded all re-
sponses using qualitative techniques [27]. Example codes tagged
phenomena of interest related to a participant’s mental model of
Alexa – for instance, whether Amazon alone handled the interac-
tion, or whether a third party was involved. Another member of the
team then individually reviewed the codes and we discussed final
themes as a research team. For both free-text survey questions, the
second team member was able to validate all the codes/responses
without disagreement.
5 RESULTS
Our survey results yield three major themes:
(1) Many participants are unaware that Alexa skills can be de-
veloped by third parties.
(2) Even when informed that Alexa skills can be developed by
third parties, most participants could not differentiate be-
tween native Alexa functionality and third-party skills, nor
between real and fake Alexa system messages. Interestingly,
frequent users were even less able to distinguish native from
third-party skills.
(3) Alexa users often do not understand the standards of how
the Alexa system functions nor what is possible and not
possible on Alexa.
5.1 Finding 1: Participants are unaware that
skills are developed by third parties
Our results showed that participants’ Conceptual Models [9] of who
develops skills and who could see the users’ data are inconsistent
with the reality, where third parties can build skills and thereby
have access to user behavioral data [28].
5.1.1 Some participants assume all Alexa contents/capabilities are
handled by first party. The participants’ Conceptual Model of the
device, particularly with regard to who builds skills, runs counter
5
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percent of Participants
Owners/Freq (41)
Owners/All (122)
Everyone (237)
Pa
rti
cip
an
t
Gr
ou
ps
Yes
No
Figure 2: Responses to the question, “Everything Alexa says
is programmed by Amazon.” Correct answer: “no.”
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Figure 3: Responses two videos. Video 1A: What parties do
you think know David added a rubber ball to his Amazon
cart? Correct answer: “Only Amazon.” Video 1B: What par-
ties do you think know your name is Benji? Correct answer:
“Both.”
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Figure 4: User explanation (coded) for their responses to
Video 1B.
to reality. As shown in Figure 2, when asked whether “everything
Alexa says is programmed by Amazon” in Survey Section 1 (with
“no” as the correct answer), 62.4% of all participants (“Everyone”)
thought the statement was true. In particular, 68.9% of “Owners/All”
answered “yes,” which suggests that familiarity with Alexa may
not always correspond to a more accurate Conceptual Model.
5.1.2 Some participants are unaware that third-party skills could
collect data. In Survey Section 1, some participants were unaware
that third parties could collect user data through Alexa skills. Fig-
ure 3 shows participants’ responses to Videos 1A and 1B that were
meant to gauge whether the participant understood that Amazon
had third-party skills, and that the third parties had access to user
responses. In particular, 46.8% of “Everyone” understood that only
Amazon had access to the cart information (Video 1A), and this
percentage increased as the level of familiarity and experience in-
creased; in fact, some 65.9% of “Owners/Freq” answered correctly.
For Video 1B, however, the more experienced participants were
associated with lower rate of correctness; for example, 56.1% of
“Owners/Freq” incorrectly believed only Amazon knew the name
was Benji, compared with only 41.4% of “Everyone.” Again, famil-
iarity with Alexa may not always correspond to a more accurate
Conceptual Model.
In an open-ended free-text question after Video 1B, we asked
why each participant answered in a certain way. Three themes
emerged from the responses: (i) Amazon originally having the
user data and subsequently sharing it with third parties (“Amazon
sharing”); (ii) Amazon originally having the data but not sharing it
with third parties (“Amazon not sharing”); and (iii) understanding
that a third-party skill could directly have access to the data (“3rd-
party skill”). For empty responses or vague responses, we used the
code “Vague/empty.”
We present a distribution of these codes in Figure 4, which sug-
gests that only 25.0% of “Everyone” understood that skills had direct
access to the data, rather than relying on Amazon to share the data.
This percentage decreases as the level of familiarity and experience
with Alexa increases; in fact, only 12.2% of “Owners/Freq” made the
same choice. An example of a response showing this understanding
included S1R13, “Data is shared by the third party developer of the
app” and another participant, S2R8, who wrote: “I think it is a skill
developed by another party, and they will have access to this data”.
For participants that were not aware of the skills, many believed
that their interactions with Alexa were strictly with Amazon. Over-
all, 27.1% of “Everyone” were coded “Amazon not sharing.” For
instance, S1R30 wrote: “As far as I’m aware, Amazon doesn’t sell any
data to other companies, it only uses it privately (I could be wrong
but I think this is true).” Similarly, S2R23 responded: “Alexa is con-
nected to Amazon and I think most info is stored and shared only with
Amazon.” In contrast, 11.0% of “Everyone” believed Amazon did
share data with third-parties (as opposed to skill developers having
direct access to the data). For instance, S1R5 wrote: “There have
been enough reports of information sharing across ’The Internet of
Things’ for me to presume that any information given to a smart
device, especially one belonging to the Amazon company, is shared
with other parties and services.” and S2R24 wrote: “I don’t trust
anyone to not sell or share data. They all do it.”
In summary, most of these responses (38.1% of “Everyone”) cen-
tered around whether or not Amazon shared the data rather than
the interaction being with a third party itself. While participants’
opinions on data sharing is irrelevant to this paper, their responses
shed light on their Conceptual Model of Alexa. For a majority of
participants, an Alexa user interacts directly with Amazon alone,
and only Amazon possesses data from the exchange as a direct
consequence. This Conceptual Model contrasts greatly with the
reality, where a skill can be built by any developer and anything a
user says in such an interaction can go directly to the developer.
5.2 Finding 2: Some participants cannot
differentiate between native and
third-party skills and messages
Even if users have an accurate Conceptual Model of Alexa with
regard to its third party skills, it is still crucial that they receive
clear Feedback [9] during conversations with Alexa that suggest
whether that exchange was with a third party.
In this section, we show that the majority of our participants
were unable to differentiate between native and third-party skills.
A consequence of these results is that Alexa users, even if they
have an accurate Conceptual Model of Alexa and its skills, might
not get clear Feedback from Alexa with regard to whether they
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have interacted with a third party. In fact, users might mistake
third party skills for native functionality, which can have serious
ramifications for their privacy and security.
5.2.1 Differentiating between native and third-party skills. In Sur-
vey Section 3, we asked participants to watch Videos 3A through
3E of a person interacting with an Alexa device. After each video,
we asked participants whether the person in the video interacted
with a native or third-party Alexa skill. Only Video 3A referred to
a native skill.
Figure 5 presents the participant responses. Although the ma-
jority of participants could correctly identify Videos 3A and 3B
(intended as easier examples), the accuracy was much lower for
the remaining videos. In the worst case, only 3.0% of “Everyone”
and 4.9% of “Owners/Freq” could correctly identify “Parental con-
trol” (Video 3E) as a third-party skill. This result shows that a user
could potentially confuse a third-party skill – whether malicious
or not – with what appears to be native functionality; the user
may accidentally leak sensitive information to the unintended third
party.
Additionally, experience and familiarity with Alexa did not al-
ways correlate with more correct responses. In fact, while 33.3% of
“Everyone” could correctly identify “Baseball Scores” (Video 3C) as
a third-party skill, only 22.0% of “Owners/Freq” could do so. This
result is inline with our previous findings for Video 1B (Figure 3).
Participant responses after Videos 3A and 3C are particularly
troubling. In Video 3A, following the message’s instructions (hold-
ing down the circle button on an Echo device) would restart the
system. In Video 3C, the fake message prompts users to go to a
website (in this case, just the Amazon website), creating potential
for a phishing attack if the website is not Amazon.com. The fact
that participants might accept system information verbally gives
potentially malicious skills significant leeway in the types of attacks
they might perform. For example, a fake skill could ask the user for
their Wi-Fi password or tell them their Alexa device is malfunction-
ing. A user’s potential inability to differentiate between real and
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Figure 7: User explanation (coded) for their responses to Au-
dios 3A and 3E.
fake system messages helps enable voice squatting and masquerad-
ing attacks [24, 25], and such attacks could be expanded to better
incorporate system messages (for example, a voice masquerading
skill could respond with an error message and then stay open).
5.2.2 Differentiating between real (native) and fake messages (which
we built). In Survey Section 3, we asked each participants to listen
to Audios 3A through 3E. As shown in Figure 6, a majority of
participants were unable to differentiate between real (i.e., as a
result of native skills) and fake (i.e., as a result of third-party skills)
Alexa systemmessages. For example, 88.6% of “Everyone” and 92.7%
of “Owners/Freq” thought that the “WiFi” message was real. Again,
familiarity of Alexa may not be correlated with a higher rate of
correct responses.
After Audios 3A and 3E, we asked participants to briefly ex-
plain their answers in the University Survey.1 We grouped the
responses into four categories: (i) functionality appearing to make
sense (“Functionality okay”); (ii) functionality not making sense
(“Functionality not okay”); (iii) audio sounding real or participant
having heard it before (“Sounds real”); and (iv) audio sounding fake
or participant never having heard it before (“Sounds fake”). We
coded vague or empty responses as “Vague/empty.”
1We did not ask for free-text response in the MTurk survey to reduce the survey
burden.
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We present the distribution of the codes in Figure 7. In both
cases, “Functionality okay” and “Sounds real” dominate the rea-
sons (while ignoring vague/empty responses). In particular, 33.3%
of “Everyone” thought Audio 3E’s functionality made sense; for
example, S1R23 said the response was real because “WiFi is nec-
essary for Alexa function”, and S1R42, who responded it was fake
because “I am not sure that Alexa has anything to do with Wifi.”
These responses suggest that some participants made judgements
on the authenticity of a message based on whether the message
was consistent with Alexa functionality. The fact that participants
made these judgements based on functionality implies that a fake
skill masquerading as the native system performing a reasonable
task might seem believable; as will be presented later, participants
did not have clear conceptions of what is reasonable on Alexa.
Furthermore, 9.6% of “Everyone” felt the clip sounded real or
claimed to have heard it before; for example, S1R8, responded: “I’ve
heard this one before”, while S1R2 said the exact opposite: “I have not
heard this previously.” Similarly, S1R11 explained their response that
the video was real based on Alexa’s voice: “It sounds official?” These
explanations suggest that participants made judgements based on
the sound of a message. While these judgements are reasonable
for users of a VUI, they can confuse users when Alexa uses the
same voice for all functionality. This can be seen in the examples
of participants that insisted they had heard Audio 3A before, which
is impossible given we faked the message.
5.3 Finding 3: Some participants do not know
what voice commands can invoke skills
Given previous findings that many users cannot differentiate be-
tween native and third-party skills, it is crucial that Discoverability
be well incorporated into Alexa’s design [9]. If users are unable to
differentiate third-party skills from native functionality, they need
a clear understanding of Alexa standards with regard to third-party
skills so that a third-party skill cannot mimic native functionality.
In this section, we present results that suggest that users do not
have a clear understanding of what phrases can invoke third-party
Alexa skills and what verbal functionality the Alexa system does
and does not provide.
5.3.1 Users do not understand what phrases can invoke third-party
skills on Alexa. Many participants held incorrect assumptions re-
garding what phrases can invoke third-party Alexa skills. While
many participants believed there were logical limits to what phrases
can invoke an Alexa skill, in reality, nearly any phrase is enough (as
long as it begins with the wake word “Alexa”). Although Amazon
encourages developers to design skills with a few recommended
invocation phrases (such as “Open <invocation name>” and “Ask
<invocation name> <some action>”), Alexa is designed to, at a min-
imum, open skills by just their name [18]. Since this name can
be arbitrary, the invocation phrase is unbounded, thus creating
challenges for Discoverability.
In Survey Section 4, we asked participants whether the six invo-
cation phrases could open skills on Alexa. As shown in Figure 8,
most participants understood that more conventional (based on
Amazon’s standards [18]) phrases such as “open Grubhub” and
“what’s the New York Times report?” can invoke skills on Alexa. In
contrast, a majority of participants (54.8% and 68.6%, respectively)
incorrectly responded that “please go away” and “there’s a bug
over there” cannot invoke skills on Alexa. Even though at the time
of writing no actual skills on the Amazon Store respond to such
invocation phrases, we successfully developed two private skills
that could respond as such.
These results highlight a problem, especially given that users
often cannot differentiate native and third-party skills (as shown in
Findings 2). The fact that many users may not understand which
phrases can successfully invoke third-party skills makes it even
more likely they can accidentally invoke some skill and not realize
it has been built by a third party. It may also increase the likelihood
of invoking a malicious skill that can try to imitate the system or
mimic another skill [24, 25]. A salient example of an attack that
could leverage this result is the fake parental controls skill presented
in Finding 2, which a vast majority of participants believed was real
and native. Even if a malicious actor is not involved, users could
still accidentally invoke a third-party skill without realizing so and
transmit sensitive information to unintended third parties.
5.3.2 Some participants did not know what can and cannot be done
with Alexa verbally. Participants often did not have clear intuitions
regarding what can and cannot be done with Alexa verbally (rather
than through the app or with physical buttons on the device).
As shown in Figure 9, participants believed that most of the
given tasks – except changing the Amazon password – could be
done verbally with Alexa, further expanding the potential attack
space for malicious skills. In reality, only changing volume and
ordering Amazon goods are feasible through Alexa’s voice inter-
face, although 90.7% of “Everyone” thought they could verbally
mute Alexa and 79.3% of “Everyone” believed they could check the
status of WiFi verbally. If a skill were to exist (whether malicious or
benign) that responded to any of these invalid invocation phrases,
a user may believe that he or she was interacting with the native
system (especially given Findings 2) and potentially leak sensitive
information.
It is worth pointing out that a vast majority (88.6%) of “Every-
one” did not believe one can verbally change their Amazon.com
password with Alexa, presumably because changing password on
non-verbal interfaces (e.g., on the web) could be the conventional
practice and doing so over the VUI may deviate from this standard.
As such, there is potentially hope of raising awareness for users
to understand what can (e.g., changing volume) and cannot (e.g.,
changing passwords) be achieved natively on Alexa; this aware-
ness would likely help users distinguish some third-party skills and
native skills and protect their privacy.
6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VUI DESIGN
Some of Alexa’s design decisions are inconsistent with Norman’s
design principles: Conceptual Model, Feedback, and Discoverabil-
ity [9]. These inconsistencies likely led to the observations in our
survey results. In this section, we propose design recommendations
for Alexa – and VUIs in general – based on these principles and
our findings.
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6.1 Recommendation 1: Having clear
indications of contexts
Our results show that many participants were unable to distinguish
between native and third-party skills (Finding 2), and this problem
was compounded by the lack of awareness of third-party skills
in the first place (Finding 1). These findings suggest that Alexa’s
design is inconsistent with the Conceptual Model and Feedback
principles.
Our recommendation is for Alexa to clearly indicate the context
to its users. This approach would provide users with the correct
Conceptual Model that there are differences between native and
third-party skills and among the third-party skills. Moreover, the
approach would offer Feedback to users as to what context the
interactions are in.
Past research in this realm has already yielded useful insights. To
protect against voice masquerading attacks, for instance, Zhang et
al. proposed a “Skill Response Checker” that checks VUI responses
for phrases that can be used to mimic the system [12]. Although
such features could be effective deterrents in some cases, our re-
search suggests that users might believe a wide array of messages,
e.g., Audio 3A, 3C and 3E, to be native system messages that would
be difficult to blacklist individually. Furthermore, our research sug-
gests that privacy concerns can arise even when skills are not trying
to be malicious. Because users cannot always differentiate between
native and third-party skills, it is possible a third-party skill might
request information that, although not inherently malicious, a user
may not want to give.
One recommendation is for Alexa devices to show visual and
audio cues. In particular, Amazon Echo already uses the Light Ring
to display system state, such as powering on, listening, connecting
to the network, or making phone calls [10]. Alexa could indicate
native and third-party contexts using the Light Ring, e.g., flashing
the lights as users switches from the native context to a third-party
skill, or showing different colors for native and third-party skills.
Aside from visual cues, Alexa could also leverage audio cues, e.g.,
using different voices for native and third-party skills or playing a
chime as a user switches from one skill to another. The fact that
79.7% of participants responded that Jeopardy is a non-native skill
(Figure 5) suggests that the change from Alexa to Alex Trebek’s
voice may have tipped off users.
Although these recommendations may help a user distinguish
between native and third-party skills, there is a tradeoff between
usability and transparency about the origin of the skill. The visual
cues are unlikely to be effective if users do not look at the Light Ring
(especially if an Amazon Echo device is stowed away in a corner
of a room and used primarily via voice). Also, there are already 12
distinct visual patterns on the Light Ring [10]; adding more patterns
to indicate context might further confuse users. The audio cues, on
the other hand, may be a distraction to users, as Amazon attempts
to build a seamless voice conversation experience where users are
not expected to notice the switch in the skill context [29].
6.2 Recommendation 2: Following consistent
Alexa design standards
Finding 3 shows that some participants do not know what com-
mands Alexa can understand to invoke skills. This observation
highlights a design of Alexa that is inconsistent with the Discover-
ability principle.
A comprehensive education of all available commands is un-
realistic, as it places unnecessary cognitive burden on the user.
According to one guide [30], there are more than 200 commands to
invoke various native skills. Furthermore, for every new third-party
skill invoked, a user would have to remember the new commands
associated with the skill.
Given that there are at least 47,000 skills available, Alexa could
learn from the Discoverability design principle [9] and follow com-
mon standards on what functions are and are not available on Alexa
natively. For instance, it is possible for an Alexa user to change the
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volume but not mute the device, set an alarm but not change the
time zone, buy groceries but not music. One simple solution is for
all hardware-related commands to be strictly non-verbal. Whenever
the Alexa system detects a command for a hardware-related feature
such as changing the volume, it should clearly respond that such
kinds of commands cannot be done; currently, if a user asks Alexa
to mute the device or turn off, Alexa just ignores the command.
Again, the exact design is not as important as Amazon setting a
consistent standard that it clearly shares with developers and users.
Additionally, Alexa could impose strict standards on how to
invoke skills. The fact that “Please go away” could actually invoke
a skill (Finding 3) potentially threatens users’ privacy. Although
Amazon recommends certain common phrases for invoking skills
such “Ask <invocation name> <some action>”, “Tell <invocation
name> <some action>”, and “Open <invocation name>”, any phrase
(other than some reserved for system functionality) can be used
to open a third-party skill on Alexa [18]. This design creates a
potentially confusing situation for users.While many skills conform
to common naming standards, Alexa’s design leaves a backdoor
for malicious skills to trick users or for one skill to accidentally
obtain sensitive user information instead of the intended one. We
recommend that Alexa follow a strict standard for invocation – for
instance, “Open <invocation name>,” but not any other phrases.
Another recommendation is for Alexa to announce information
about the skill, such as the developer’s name, before running the
skill for the first time; this approach could provide users with more
transparency on the third party. However, these recommendations
are, again, associated with usability trade-offs, because they make
Alexa’s VUI less flexible and more cumbersome to interact with
and may go against Amazon’s attempts to build a seamless voice
conversation experience [29].
7 FUTUREWORK
Although most of our participants believed that the “malicious”
skills we had developed were native skills, it is unclear how often
similar skills could be deployed on the Amazon Skill Store. If these
malicious skills are prevalent, a user could confuse a malicious skill
for a native skill or another benign skill, or a user could confuse one
benign skill for another benign skill; in either case, the user could
be revealing sensitive information to an unintended third-party
skill developer, which poses a privacy risk.
To identify such skills in the wild, one of the challenges is scal-
ability. In particular, more than 47,000 skills are available on the
Amazon Skill Store at the time of writing. We would need to de-
velop a method to programmatically invoke each skill and, based
on the skill’s response, determine if the skill resemble another na-
tive or third-party skill whether intentionally or unintentionally,
as such resemblance may cause confusion among users. This au-
tomatic technique is difficult, because skills are executed remotely
and each verbal interaction with a skill is associated with an HTTP
request [16]. Unlike mobile apps, for which we can use off-the-shelf-
tools for static (e.g., by downloading the binaries) and dynamic
analyses (e.g., Android Monkey [31]), we are not aware of any es-
tablished tools or techniques to analyze skills at scale. We defer this
analysis to future work.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we surveyed 237 new and existing users of Alexa
devices. We found that some participants were unaware that skills
could be developed by third parties, that most participants failed to
distinguish native and third-party skills and voice messages, and
that they often did not understand what functions or voice com-
mands could be understood by Alexa. Surprisingly, participants
with more familiarity and experience with Alexa tended to show
signs of confusion. These findings suggest that a user may acci-
dentally invoke an unintended skill without being aware of this
mistake; regardless of whether the skill is malicious or benign, the
uninteded third party may obtain sensitive user information, thus
giving rise to privacy risks. Our recommendations include develop-
ing audio and visual indicators of native and third-party contexts,
as well as following a consistent design standard to help users learn
what functions are and are not possible on Alexa.
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